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Principles to Practices for Responsible AI:
Closing the Gap
Daniel Schiff1 and Bogdana Rakova2 and Aladdin Ayesh3 and Anat Fanti4 and Michael Lennon5
Abstract. Companies have considered adoption of various high-
level artificial intelligence (AI) principles for responsible AI, but
there is less clarity on how to implement these principles as orga-
nizational practices. This paper reviews the principles-to-practices
gap. We outline five explanations for this gap ranging from a disci-
plinary divide to an overabundance of tools. In turn, we argue that
an impact assessment framework which is broad, operationalizable,
flexible, iterative, guided, and participatory is a promising approach
to close the principles-to-practices gap. Finally, to help practitioners
with applying these recommendations, we review a case study of AI’s
use in forest ecosystem restoration, demonstrating how an impact as-
sessment framework can translate into effective and responsible AI
practices.
1 Introduction
Artificial intelligence (AI) is already in use across many areas of so-
cial and economic life, and new opportunities for AI to contribute to
social good (AI4SG) have also been proposed and developed [13].
For example, efforts like Microsoft’s AI for Earth program highlight
the potential of AI to address the United Nation’s Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs). However, many challenges face the practical
implementation of AI for social good efforts. Similarly, in the field
of fairness, accountability, and transparency of AI, decades of re-
search has only recently begun to be more thoroughly incorporated
into practical settings, and many questions remain. In this paper we
review challenges in translating principles into practices and propose
recommendations towards closing this gap.
After introducing prior work on responsible AI principles and con-
cerns about the practical application of these principles in Section 1,
Section 2 proposes five explanations for the principles-to-practices
gap. We discuss the complexity of AI’s impacts, confusion about the
distribution of accountability, a social technical disciplinary divide,
identifying and using tools, and organizational processes and norms
as key issues in this gap.
In light of these concerns, Section 3 proposes the criteria of a
framework that could help organizations turn responsible AI prin-
ciples into practices. We propose that impact assessment is a promis-
ing approach towards meeting these criteria, as it has the potential
to be sufficiently broad, operationalizable, flexible, iterative, guided,
and participatory. As an exemplar, we focus on the new Institute
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of Electrical and Electronics Engineerings (IEEE) 7010-2020 Rec-
ommended Practice for Assessing the Impact of Autonomous and
Intelligent Systems on Human Well-being (henceforth IEEE 7010).
IEEE 7010 is a standard that assesses the well-being implications of
AI and employs a well-being impact assessment to do so. Finally,
to help practitioners apply these recommendations. Section 4 ap-
plies a well-being impact assessment framework to a case study. The
case study reviews challenges with AI’s use in ecosystem restora-
tion and afforestation – an important aspect related to several SDGs
– and demonstrates how an impact assessment framework may help
to close the principles-to-practices gap in this case.
1.1 Principles
As of 2019, more than 20 firms6 have produced frameworks, princi-
ples, guidelines, and policies related to the responsible development
and use of artificial intelligence (AI).7 These documents are meant to
address many of the social and ethical issues that surround AI, rang-
ing from labor displacement [3] and algorithmic bias [7] to privacy,
an increasingly important issue in the context of the COVID-19 virus
[44]. These governance documents typically address a set of social
and ethical concerns, propose principles in response, and in some
cases offer concrete reforms or internal governance strategies.
Research on the various AI documents produced by firms along
with government actors and non-governmental associations has iden-
tified clear consensus in organizations’ ethical priorities [21, 23, 41].
The social and ethical concerns highlighted most often surround gen-
eral concern for public, customer, and employee welfare; algorithmic
bias and fairness; transparency and explainability; trust in AI; and
reliability and safety of AI products [61]. While this scholarship of-
ten focuses on identifying consensus across organizations [34], it has
also examined how companies define their responsibilities [29] and
whether there are issues neglected across documents.
Importantly, a key focus of the documents is on presenting a set of
high-level principles for responsible AI. For example, Google’s AI
principles include “Be socially beneficial,” “Avoid creating or rein-
forcing AI bias,” “Be built and tested for safety,” and “Be accountable
to people,” among other principles [28]. OpenAI discusses its focus
on “Broadly Distributed Benefits,” “Long-Term Safety,” “Technical
Leadership,” and its “Cooperative Orientation” [50]. However, these
and other high-level responsible AI principles can often be vague,
host a multitude of possible interpretations, and may be difficult to
translate into everyday practices.
6 For example, Google, Microsoft, IBM, Sage, Workday, Unity Technologies,
and Salesforce
7 We opt for the phrase ‘responsible AI’ but this topic can also be termed as
the ‘ethical AI,’ ’trustworthy AI’ or similar.
1.2 Practices
Many scholars have raised concerns that companies less often pro-
vide detailed prescriptions of policies or practices meant to ensure
that these principles are adhered to [29, 34, 61]. In some cases, com-
panies have established relatively clear strategies. Proposed prac-
tices include training, hiring, algorithm development frameworks and
tools, and governance strategies. For example, Vodafone’s AI Frame-
work provides some detail on specific actions it will take, such as
adhering to its Code of Conduct and privacy commitments [70]. SAP
proposes as part of its Guiding Principles an AI Ethics Steering Com-
mittee and an AI Ethics Advisory Panel [59]. IBM’s Everyday Ethics
for AI provides a set of recommended actions and questions for its
employees to address key concerns [33].
On the other hand, some principles are not accompanied by clear
expressions of changes to practice. For example, documents from
Tieto, Futurice, and Salesforce focus on abstract principles and com-
mitments. Futurice proposes to “avoid creating or reinforcing bias,”
while Salesforce claims “we test models with diverse data sets, seek
to understand their impact, and build inclusive teams” and Tieto
states it is “committed to harness AI for good, for the planet and hu-
mankind” [25, 57, 68]. These and other generic principles like “Be
socially beneficial“ beg the question of how exactly the companies
are carrying out their commitments.
In the best case, companies may still be in the process of working
out the details or may have communicated their intended strategies in
other venues, for example, by publishing tools for responsible prac-
tice. Nevertheless, remaining at the “mission statement” level and
the lack of practical detail are worrisome. We believe that the ques-
tion of translating high-level principles into effective and responsible
practices is a critical priority in the near-term future for AI. Closing
the principles-to-practices gap is worthy of attention by companies
developing AI, by those who might procure and deploy AI systems,
and by other stakeholders and the public more broadly.
1.3 Principles without Practices?
Despite firms’ efforts towards establishing some design and devel-
opment principles for AI systems, several breaches of law and the
public trust have been reported in the last few years. Companies have
come under significant scrutiny, in some cases facing significant neg-
ative media attention, along with customer criticism and employee
petitions, walkouts, and resignations [66].
The question then is why principles have seemingly not been trans-
lated into effective practices? In fact, the process of translation is nei-
ther obvious nor automatic as clear. According to Mittelstadt (2019)
“norms and requirements can rarely be logically deduced without
accounting for specific elements of the technology, application, con-
text of use, or relevant local norms”. Barring practical guidance and
absent “empirically proven methods in real-world development con-
texts,” [41] claims of responsible AI may amount to no more just that
— claims.
As a result, some criticisms more deeply impugn the motives of
firms. Greene et al. [29] argue that companies attempt to shift re-
sponsibility onto designers and experts in order to minimize scrutiny
of business decisions. Similarly, Hagendorff [31] argues that compa-
nies are often driven by an economic logic, and that “engineers and
developers are neither systematically educated about ethical issues,
nor are they empowered, for example by organizational structures,
to raise ethical concerns.” On this account, companies may be strate-
gically promoting their principles to ameliorate customer trust and
reputational concerns. In this way, they can appear actively engaged
regarding AI’s ethical risks in the public eye, but while framing is-
sues so as to minimize genuine accountability.
While some of these deeper criticisms may be true in part or for
some organizations, we think a more multifaceted and charitable in-
terpretation [1, 6] is both appropriate and likely to be beneficial to-
ward seeking positive change. Organizations are best understood not
as monolithic single actors, but as multiple coordinating and com-
peting coalitions of individuals [39]. Individuals within a single or-
ganization may have multiple or competing preferences and roles.
Organizational motives should therefore be considered a complex
composition of genuine ethical concern, economic logic, signaling
and framing strategies, and promotion of both internal and external
changes [61].
Researchers who have noticed the principles-to-practices gap have
begun proposing strategies [14], often aimed at companies. These
proposals include changes to software mechanisms (such as audit
trails), hardware mechanisms (such as secure hardware enclaves),
and institutional mechanisms (such as red team exercises) [8]. This
work highlights that it is not only technical practices that must adapt,
but also organizational practices.
Among the most comprehensive work assessing the principles-to-
practices gap is the review by Morley et al. (2019), which system-
atically explores existing responsible AI tools and methodologies
mapped against six components of the AI development lifecycle: 1)
business and use-case development, 2) design phase, 3) training and
test data procurement, 4) building, 5) testing, 6) deployment, and 7)
monitoring [42]. They identify 106 such tools and methodologies.
Some such methods are relatively narrower in scope, such as those
surrounding explainable AI [30], bias [7], or procurement (e.g., the
AI-RFX Procurement Framework).
Other methodologies adopt a broader scope of focus, including im-
pact assessments like the ISO 26000 Framework for Social Responsi-
bility [72] and IEEE 7010 [43]. Relevant methods and approaches for
responsible AI also come from outside of the AI domain and include
privacy-by-design [48], value-sensitive design [24], the Responsible
Research and Innovation (RRI) approach [63], and numerous others.
In fact, the plethora of possible tools is itself a challenge which we
discuss more in Section 2.
2 Explaining the Principles-to-Practices Gap
In short, despite the urgent attention to responsible AI in recent years,
there are already many existing frameworks and a growing set of new
methods aimed at addressing core ethical issues. Why then does the
issue of translating principles to practices seem intractable? We offer
a few candidate explanations that are neither exhaustive nor mutually
exclusive.
2.1 The Complexity of AI’s Impacts
AI’s impacts on human well-being – positive or negative – are more
complex than is sometimes assumed. Site-based research has iden-
tified that engineers are often focused on single products and the
physical harm they may cause rather than broader kinds of harms,
such as social, emotional, or economic harms [69]. Even as con-
versations surrounding responsible AI increase, most work centers
around a relatively small subset of issues, most often bias [5] and
transparency [2] in particular AI models. This approach involves ex-
posing and then attempting to mitigate bias in algorithms as well as
trying to improve interpretability or explainability given the black-
boxed nature of certain AI models which can make decision-making
processes opaque. Other commonly-emphasized issues include pri-
vacy, reliability, and safety.
However, these prominent issues most familiar to engineers still
constitute only a subset of social and ethical risks and impacts re-
lated to AI. Indeed, AI can be understood to impact a wide vari-
ety of aspects of human well-being, such as human rights, inequal-
ity, human-human relationships, social and political cohesion, psy-
chological health, and more. AI can also impact natural ecosystems
and animal life.8 Moreover, many of these harms do not arise in a
straightforward way from a singleAI product, but from many AI sys-
tems influencing human social and economic life together and over
time.
AI is not the only technology with complex implications on human
well-being. Yet its rapid rise is leading to calls for urgency, and some
aspects of AI surface a unique combination of ethical concerns [13].
For example, compared to other general-purpose technologies like
electricity or the internet, AI is notable for its autonomy, its capac-
ity to ‘learn,’ and its power in making accurate predictions, all while
embedded in software and ambient systems and therefore invisible
to many affected by it. As a result, AI systems are becoming increas-
ingly ubiquitous, and can act in the aggregate to influence human and
social well-being in subtle but pervasive ways.
For example, algorithms on social media designed to steer con-
sumers to entertaining video clips have also led to so-called filter
bubbles that may foster political polarization, misinformation and
propaganda, targeting of minority groups, and election interference.
AI as instantiated in autonomous vehicles has potentially massive im-
plications for physical infrastructure, energy and environment, traffic
fatalities, work productivity, urban design, and unemployment [4]. In
short, addressing AI principles in full seriousness requires an expan-
sive scope of attention to the full set of issues influencing human
well-being. This requires looking well beyond a narrow set of topics
such as bias, transparency, privacy, or safety and treating them as in-
dependent issues. Instead, the full range of topics and their complex
interdependencies needs to be understood. However, such a task can
be enormously difficult.
2.2 The Many Hands Problem
It is clear that responsibly designing and applying AI is therefore
both a technical challenge and a social one (implicating social, eco-
nomic, and policy questions). For example, creating a facial recogni-
tion system for policing that minimizes racial bias (by some technical
measure) is inseparable from questions on the legitimacy of the use
of that system in a particular social and policy setting. However the
question of distributing accountability for addressing these issues re-
mains open and contested. Engineers and computer scientists may
see their responsibility as focused on the quality and safety of a par-
ticular product rather than on larger scale social issues, and may be
unaware of the wider set of implications [20]. Business managers
and companies may see their responsibility as fiduciary, in produc-
ing high-quality products and revenue. This potentially creates holes
in responsibility for addressing key well-being impacts of AI.
In addition to uncertainty regarding one’s scope of professional ac-
countability, engineers and computer scientists who focus on design
of systems may have limited influence within their organizations.
They may expect business managers, liability officers, or corporate
8 Impacts on the environment and non-human animals may be intrinsically
important, as well as instrumentally important to human well-being.
social responsibility staff to assess broader social and ethical issues.
Social scientists and ethicists tapped specifically for these issues may
find themselves similarly handicapped, perhaps in an external advi-
sory role without real say. The result is the ‘many hands’ problem,
where responsibility for responsible AI is distributed and muddled
[22]. The many stakeholders involved in shaping AI need to be both
functionally able and willing to resolve the accountability question
with a concrete division of labor. If companies fail to resolve these
challenges, they may continue to face public scrutiny as well as fi-
nancial and legal risks and reputational harms. Moreover, they may
harm their employees, consumers, or the public. Figuring out how
to distribute responsibility for AI’s impacts on well-being is there-
fore as critical as it is difficult. It may involve challenging long-held
assumptions and shifting norms.
2.3 The Disciplinary Divide
Another related challenge is the plurality of professional disciplines
with roles to play in responsible AI. Discourse on responsible AI has
been advanced not only by engineers and computer scientists, but
also by sociologists, ethicists, historians and philosophers of technol-
ogy, policy scholars, political decision-makers, journalists, members
of the public, and more. Yet the composition of these diverse stake-
holders directs attention to the likelihood that they may bring very
different perspectives to the table. They may differ in their techni-
cal and ethical education, their framing of problems and solutions,
their attitudes and values towards responsible AI, and their norms of
communication.
Consider attempts to apply the principle of fairness in attempting
to minimize bias. Arguably, a thoughtful AI engineer today might
identify a normative principle like ’fairness,’ specified in a corporate
responsible AI policy, pick a plausible fairness metric to instantiate
it (noting there are ineliminable trade-offs between different metrics
[12]), apply it, and communicate these decisions transparently [37].
However, even these laudable efforts cannot begin to satisfy the ex-
tensive societal questions related to fairness, discrimination, and in-
equality that trouble many social scientists and ethicists.
More specifically, approaching social issues like bias and fairness
too narrowly leads to what Selbst et al. (2018) call category or ab-
straction errors. For example, computer scientists and engineers de-
veloping AI systems can fail to consider how an AI system will be
implemented in different social contexts, influence human behavior
in those contexts, or lead to long-term ripple effects, all of which
can threaten the assumptions on which the AI system is built. This
is especially difficult as predicting a technology’s usage and impact
is known by historians of science and technology to be difficult [71].
More fundamentally, AI developers may err in even considering so-
cial concepts like fairness to be computationally definable and tech-
nically soluble [65].
Consider an algorithm designed to minimize racial bias that is used
to inform a judge’s decision about criminal sentencing. An algorithm
designed and trained on test data from one jurisdiction may translate
poorly to another region. It may influence the judge’s decisions in
unexpected ways, as a judge may overtrust or undertrust the algo-
rithm, or even hold values contrary to those reflected in the algorithm.
For example, the algorithm may favor predictive accuracy, while the
judge favors leniency and second chances. The consequences for
criminal justice outcomes when such a system is used in complex
contexts is unclear, and may feed back in unexpected or problematic
ways if an AI is trained on data the system has itself helps to gener-
ate. To reiterate, there are many questions about responsible AI that
cannot be straightforwardly addressed with a narrow technical lens.
On the other hand, social scientists may bring a lens that is broader
but faces an inverse problem to the problem faced by engineers.
Frameworks for considering social and ethical consequences of AI
more in line with the thinking of social scientists can be unhelpfully
complex and vague, and therefore fail to translate into action. For
example, ethicists recognize that concepts like justice are complex,
while political scientists know that values surrounding justice are po-
litically contested. Yet AI engineers must define some measure of
justice to implement it.
In addressing issues like inequality, social scientists may propose
large structural changes to economic and social systems, some of
which are difficult to achieve (e.g., reforming the motives of corpora-
tions) and others possibly far-fetched (e.g., changing the structure of
capitalism). These structural changes may be significantly outside of
the scope of control of AI engineers. Also unhelpful are conceptions
of AI based on sweeping, overly futuristic, or unrealistic generaliza-
tions. These abstractions can fail to provide the specificity needed to
think clearly about addressing harms to human well-being. Again,
while the intentions may be laudable, translating them to practice
can be unfeasible or at best unclear. In the best case, it is difficult
to resolve the awkwardness of attempting to apply technical fixes to
fundamentally socio-technical problems. Something is lost in trans-
lation.
2.4 The Abundance of Tools
As we have seen, there are already many tools and methodologies
for addressing responsible development and use of AI. While creat-
ing more and better such tools and methodologies is a worthy pursuit,
in one sense there are already too many. Even those tools that do ex-
ist have arguably not been tested sufficiently to demonstrate which
are most effective and in which contexts [41]. An over-abundance
problem makes it difficult for individuals to sort through and assess
the utility of a given tool, or to weigh it against the many other avail-
able tools. People’s time, attention, and cognitive capacity is limited,
leading to search and transaction cost problems. As a result, individ-
uals and organizations may fail to take advantage of the useful tools
and methodologies that are already out there.
In addition, many tools and methodologies are not supported by
practical guidance [42]. A published journal paper or open source
code may explain basic functionality but not contain sufficient in-
structions to apply, customize, or troubleshoot tools and methodolo-
gies, especially in a variety of organizational contexts and use cases.
This means that only tools that are well-documented, perhaps those
created by well-resourced companies or universities and backed up
by online communities, may be feasible to use. Individuals without
high levels of expertise and specific training may have little luck even
with these prominent tools.
Further, because of the disciplinary divide, methodologies devel-
oped in part or in whole by disciplines outside of engineering and
computer science (such as responsible research and design ethics)
may have a harder time gaining traction. If these extra-disciplinary
ideas are not documented and translated for use in AI development
settings, there may be little uptake. More work is needed to test tools
empirically, to streamline access and guidance, and to help with sort-
ing between tools and methods. Organizations may need an overarch-
ing framework to help integrate these lower-level tools and method-
ologies.
2.5 The Division of Labor
The last explanation for the principles-to-practices that we discuss
is how organizations structure their job responsibilities and work-
flow related to AI. Again related to the disciplinary divide, a major
concern is that the computer scientists and engineers more directly
responsible for an AI system’s development may be functionally sep-
arated from other workers likely to be tasked with thinking about the
system’s broader implications – such as higher-level business man-
agers, the C-suite, and corporate social responsibility and compliance
staff. For simplicity, we refer to these crassly as ‘technical’ and ‘non-
technical’ teams.
For instance, several companies have proposed external AI ethics
advisory or governance boards. External boards (and likely internal
ones) may constitute functionally distinct units of the organization
that interact only occasionally with primary AI system designers.
The same functional separation may apply even when non-technical
teams are internal to an organization.
Non-technical employees may have limited ability to understand
or modify an AI system’s design if interaction with technical teams
happens at an arm’s distance. Staff without disciplinary expertise in
engineering and computer science and even those with technical ex-
pertise but not involved in the system’s creation may not be able to
imagine improvements to the system’s development or deployment.
They may make underinformed or overly simplistic decisions, for ex-
ample, prohibiting the use of an AI system that could be modified; or
recommending the use of an AI system when they do not fully under-
stand its risks. This functional separation therefore limits their ability
to support responsible AI development that adequately considers the
full range of impacts on human well-being.
On the other hand, engineers and computer scientists in techni-
cal teams may also not be privy to the deliberations of their non-
technical counterparts if there is functional organizational separation.
If technical employees are exempt from this dialogue, they will not
be able to participate in how their colleagues weigh considerations of
corporate responsibility, profit, policy, and social and ethical impacts.
They may not learn how to incorporate these concepts and trade-offs
into their design processes. Technical teams may also fail to imag-
ine ways in which the system they are creating could be improved, or
how other systems, tools, or methodologies could be applied to better
safeguard and improve human well-being. In sum, functional sepa-
ration of technical and non-technical experts in organizations limits
the potential to communicate effectively, understand issues robustly,
and respond to considerations of AI’s impacts on well-being.
2.6 Summarizing the Concerns
In this section, we have reviewed five sets of concerns that we be-
lieve help to explain why AI principles do not easily translate into
concrete and effective practices: 1) that AI’s social and ethical impli-
cations for human well-being are broader, more complex, and more
unpredictable than is often understood; 2) that accountability for eth-
ical consequences is divided and muddled; 3) that the orientations of
experts in different disciplines lead to emphases that are too narrow,
too broad, and generally difficult for translation and interdisciplinary
communication; 4) that existing methodologies and tools for respon-
sible AI are hard to access, evaluate, and apply effectively; and 5) that
organizational practices and norms which divide technical from non-
technical teams minimizes the chance of developing well-considered
AI systems that can safeguard and improve human well-being.
3 Closing the Gap
3.1 Criteria of an Effective Framework for
Responsible AI
Given the proposed explanations above, how can we begin to close
the principles-to-practices gap? We think an overarching frame-
work for responsible AI development can help to streamline practice
and leverage existing tools and methodologies. What would be the
desiderata of such a framework for responsible AI?9 As a starting
point and based on the identified gaps, we suggest the following:
• Broad: it should consider AI’s impacts expansively, across many
different ethical issues and aspects of social and economic
life. Narrower tools and methodologies such as bias mitigation,
privacy-by-design, and product design documentation [27, 40] can
then be subsumed under this more comprehensive framework. For
example, after identifying the scope of an AI system’s impacts
to human-wellbeing, designers could determine which lower-level
sub-tools and methodologies are relevant.
• Operationalizable: it should enable users to cast conceptual prin-
ciples and goals into specific strategies that can be implemented in
real-world systems. This includes identifying relevant actions and
decisions, assigned to the appropriate stage of an AI’s lifecycle,
e.g., use case conception, system development, deployment, mon-
itoring. This also means identifying accountable parties for these
decisions at multiple levels of governance — engineers, design-
ers, lawyers, executives. This helps to ensure that accountability
for actions is assigned to those with the capacity to implement
them.
• Flexible: it should be able to adapt to a wide variety of AI systems,
use cases, implementation contexts, and organizational settings. A
flexible framework has greater applicability to more kinds of AI
systems and use cases, allowing for shared language and learning,
while enabling sufficiently customization.
• Iterative: it should be applied throughout the lifecycle of an AI
system and repeatedly as the AI system, implementation context,
or other external factors change, not only at one point. Responsible
AI is not one-and-done.
• Guided: it should be easy to access and understand, with sufficient
documentation for users of moderate skill to apply, customize, and
troubleshoot across different contexts. It should also be tested in
different contexts with evidence of effectiveness made public.
• Participatory: it should incorporate the perspectives and input
from stakeholders from a range of disciplines as well as those that
may be impacted by the AI system, especially the public. Trans-
lating principles “into business models, workflows, and product
design” will be an ongoing effort that requires engineers, com-
puter scientists, social scientists, lawyers, members of the public,
and others to work together [36].
A framework that meets these criteria balances the need for techni-
cal specificity with an equally important need for conceiving of AI’s
impacts on human well-being in their full breadth and complexity,
understanding we cannot fully predict all of AI’s possible ramifica-
tions. That is, while some prominent strategies for responsible AI
assume there are only a small set of issues to address, such as bias,
transparency, and privacy, we have argued that AI’s impacts are more
complex.
9 Akin to what Dignum calls ‘Ethics in Design’ [15]
We think that impact assessments are a promising strategy towards
achieving these criteria [9]. Impact assessments have been used his-
torically in human rights [36], in regulatory contexts [53], and more
recently to study the impact of AI or algorithms [9, 55]. We focus
specifically on the recently published IEEE 7010 standard as an ex-
emplar [43, 60] created specifically to assess AI’s impacts on hu-
man well-being.10 We argue below that impact assessments like the
well-being impact assessment from the IEEE 7010 standard could be
adopted by companies pursuing responsible AI development as well
as incorporated into the institutions which train future practitioners.
3.2 Impact Assessments for Responsible AI
Building on the IEEE 7010 standard, a well-being impact assessment
is an iterative process that entails (1) internal analysis, (2) user and
stakeholder engagement, and (3) data collection, among other activi-
ties. Internal analysis involves broadly assessing the possible harms,
risks, and intended and unintended users and uses of an AI system.
Here, developers and managers of an AI system carefully consider a
wide range of an AI system’s potential impacts on human well-being,
not limited to prominent issues like privacy, bias, or transparency.
Critically, assessing impacts requires not just speculating about
impacts, but measuring them. Therefore, the user and stakeholder
engagement stages of the assessment include learning from users of
AI systems as well as others more indirectly impacted to determine
how the system impacts their well-being. When developers have ac-
cess to users, this may include asking them about possible or actual
psychological impacts, economic impacts, changes to relationships,
work-life balance, or health. . This is again in contrast to strategies
which focus solely on technical fixes to issues like bias or privacy
during the design stage alone and fail to account for the broader uni-
verse of well-being implications.
Finally, data collection based on the continuous assessment of the
identified possible impacts is key. Here we refer to the collection and
tracing of data related to the impact assessment, which may exceed
collection of data related to the development of the AI system itself.
Data can be collected through user surveys, focus, groups, publicly-
available data sources, or directly as system outputs. In sum, we pro-
pose that adherence to – and rigorous documentation of – impact as-
sessments will contribute to the continuous improvement of AI sys-
tems by ensuring that organizations are better able to understand and
address AI’s many impacts on human well-being.
Not all tools entitled ‘impact assessment’ meet our definition.
Many existing tools consider only a small scope of possible impacts.
Some fail to measure impacts at all, instead focusing on anticipating
impacts assumed to be important and applying best practices to avoid
associated harms. Inversely, some tools that are not labelled ‘impact
assessments’ might be classified as such under our definition, such
as the European Commission’s Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI
[19]. Notably, some frameworks have been proposed by the public
sector (i.e., governments) and others by non-governmental organiza-
tions and companies.
Why is impact assessment as we have defined it a promising
approach? First, it can be highly broad, measuring many aspects
of human social and economic well-being and even environmen-
tal impacts. IEEE 7010 is an exemplar in its breadth. It identifies
10 IEEE is in the process of developing standards surrounding ethical AI
on a variety of topics — bias, privacy, nudging, trustworthiness of news,
and overall human well-being [11]. While the authors of this paper were
involved in helping to develop IEEE 7010, this paper reflects the individual
views of the authors and not an official position of the IEEE.
twelve domains as part of its well-being impact assessment: affect,
community, culture, education, economy, environment, health, hu-
man settlements, government, psychological/mental well-being, and
work [43].11 For an AI system like a chatbot or autonomous vehi-
cle, the impact assessment may lead to identification of numerous
areas of concern like social relationships, the environment, psycho-
logical health, and economy. Thus while other responsible AI ap-
proaches take into account a far narrower range of concerns, em-
phasizing largely bias and transparency of algorithms, IEEE 7010’s
well-being impact assessment is far more broad-ranging.
Impact assessments can also be highly operationalizable into spe-
cific strategies. In IEEE 7010, overarching domains like human well-
being or environmental impacts are not just stated in abstract terms,
but are measured through specific indicators based on rigorous re-
search. The strategy involves internal analysis, followed by user and
stakeholder engagement, both used to determine domains where an
AI system can impact human well-being. Next, AI system creators
can identify measurable indicators related to each domain, followed
by measuring the impacts of their AI system on the selected indica-
tors. For example, through using the well-being impact assessment,
an AI developer might identify the environment as an important con-
cern, and increases in air pollution as a specific possible impact. Us-
ing validated indicators to measure air pollution, the developer could
then assess whether air pollution has increased or decreased.
Next, given the extensive range of possible impacts that can be
measured, there is also ample room to customize an impact assess-
ment and make it sufficiently flexible for particular use cases and
organizational contexts. ALGO-CARE is one such example of an
impact assessment applied specifically to algorithms in the criminal
justice system [51]. ALGO-CARE considers context-specific issues
like whether human officers retain decision-making discretion and if
proposed AI tools improve the criminal justice system in a demon-
strable way. Similarly, users of IEEE 7010 would find that their im-
pact assessment approach could be customized to focus on issues
ranging from housing to human rights. Impact assessments also typ-
ically leave room to determine which actions are taken in response
to identified impacts, meaning these responses can be applied in an
iterative fashion, not only during the design phase. For example,
concerns about impacts of an AI system on pollution could lead to
changes not only during an AI system’s design, but also in terms of
its implementation in the real world. Moreover, it is impossible to fin-
ish an impact assessment only during the design stage, as it requires
measuring its impacts in real-world settings.
However, this breadth and flexibility suggest to us that guidance
is the most challenging issue currently. Simply, there is no one-to-
one mapping from identified impacts or problems with AI systems
to individual technical or implementation ‘fixes’ and creating such
a comprehensive mapping is likely not plausible. The breadth and
complexity of an AI well-being impact assessment demonstrate the
difficulties for any actor who attempts to single-handedly close the
gap from principles to practices. Thus, we propose that developing
guidance for particular sectors, types of AI systems, and use cases
is a necessary and ongoing effort which could leverage a participa-
tory process-driven impact assessment approach that engages differ-
ent groups of stakeholders.12 In particular, developers, policymakers,
11 All discussion of IEEE 7010 is adapted and reprinted with permission from
IEEE. Copyrights IEEE 2020. All rights reserved.
12 Importantly, the impact assessment tool selected need not be IEEE 7010’s
well-being impact assessment; impact assessment frameworks with devel-
oped by the Canadian government [49] and AI Now [55] are examples of
other promising tools already available.
philosophers, intended and unintended users of the technology be-
ing developed, and others could equally contribute in the AI impact
assessment process, such as through interviews, focus groups, and
participatory design methods [64].
We are hopeful that more scholars and organizations focused on
responsible uses of AI will adopt an assessment approach that mea-
sures a wide range of impacts on human well-being and meets the cri-
teria identified above. A key aspect of creating the supportive struc-
ture for effective impact assessments will be adopting new educa-
tional practices in institutions of higher education as well as organi-
zational changes in firms. We turn to these issues briefly.
3.3 Supportive Practices in Institutions of Higher
Education
Educational institutions also have an important role to play. Educa-
tional systems have undertaken meaningful efforts aimed at increas-
ing ethical sensitivity and decision-making, but have not yet made
the changes needed to support responsible AI practice. Of around
200 AI/ML/data science courses reviewed by Saltz et al. (2019), lit-
tle more than 1 in 10 mentioned ethics in their syllabus or course de-
scription. Those that did focused overwhelmingly on bias, fairness,
and privacy [58]. While courses focused specifically on AI ethics
cover a wider set of issues including consequences of algorithms,
technically tractable issues like bias and privacy are still prominent
[26]. We suggest that AI ethics education focus not solely on a few
prominent or technically tractable issues nor on general awareness
building alone, but also on impact assessment as an overarching
framework to understand AI’s impacts on human well-being.
AI ethics and design courses should also recruit and serve students
of social sciences and humanities (and other ‘non-technical’ fields).
Calls for more STEM education for these individuals often result in
them taking a small number of basic computer science or statistics
courses. We believe that more fundamental interaction with AI sys-
tems is important to build capacity in these students, who should be
“capable of grasping technical details” in order to translate abstract
principles and concepts from these fields into concrete computer and
data ethics practices [31]. In turn, students in social scientists and
humanities can help to expand the scope of thinking of their coun-
terparts in engineering and computer science. For example, AI ethics
and design courses can facilitate interdisciplinary teamwork that in-
volves the use of impact assessments. Such an approach would allow
students to understand the range of AI’s impacts and practice apply-
ing relevant tools and methodologies in response. Interdisciplinary
teaming could also occur through student extracurricular clubs and
contests (not limited to grand prizes) to encourage this kind of cross-
disciplinary learning and practice.
3.4 Supportive Practices in Business Organizations
Analogous to the educational setting, companies developing or de-
ploying AI should move towards the integration of technical and non-
technical teams rather than functional separation of roles, for reasons
discussed in the previous section. These integrated teams could in-
clude technical developers as well as other individuals tasked with
considering impacts of an AI system who may have social science,
humanities, business, law, or ethics expertise, or who can represent a
typical user’s perspective effectively. Such a change requires estab-
lishing practices that are integrated with engineering and software
lifecycles and part of the ongoing dialogue characteristic of devel-
opment processes. Already, organizations have proposed including
a residential non-technical thinker tasked with responsible AI — an
‘ethics engineer’ or ’responsible AI champion’ [52].
However, we would urge that these integrated teams not remain
at an arm’s distance in a way that maintains bifurcated expertise ar-
eas and roles. Instead, technical and non-technical team members
should aim learn each other’s languages and work jointly. For ex-
ample, an AI development team could include ethnographers, policy
scholars, or philosophers, all tasked with applying a broad impact as-
sessment as the AI system is being created and implemented. While
these changes to organizational practice may be difficult, requiring
individuals to stretch their boundaries, we believe that a deep level
of integration is necessary to bridge the disciplinary divide.
Organizations could also engage in interdisciplinary and interde-
partmental cross-training, potentially supported by responsible AI
champions or external experts. For example, organizations could fa-
cilitate red team exercises [8] or hypothetical case studies that draw
on the impact assessment approach. Practicing even on hypotheti-
cal cases allows social science-oriented practitioners and technically-
oriented practitioners to learn from one another about how they can
define problems, consider solutions, define terminology, etc. This can
help diverse disciplinary practitioners begin to learn and establish
common language and identify gaps and opportunities in each other’s
practice.
In summary, we have argued that impact assessments are a promis-
ing strategy to address the gaps between principles and effective
practices for responsible AI. However, applying an impact assess-
ment might feel like an abstract exercise to those who have not done
it. To demonstrate how closing the principles-to-practices gaps with
an impact assessment might occur, we move now to a case study.
4 Case Study: Impact Assessments to Support
Responsible AI for Forest Ecosystem Restoration
In this section, we set out to explore how the recommendations in-
troduced above could be implemented within a particular setting. We
hope this case study will help practitioners in adapting our research
findings to the unique sociotechnical context within which their own
work is situated. In the example case study below, we look at AI
systems that are being used to address forest ecosystem restoration.
4.1 Case Study Background
As is characteristic of the SDGs, achieving goals in one area – like
the environment – also has effects on multiple other goals, such as
addressing health and poverty targets. Forest restoration is one such
aspect of the SDGs. While it has clear importance to SDG 13 (Cli-
mate Action) and SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption and Produc-
tion), forest ecosystem restoration is addressed most directly by SDG
15 (Life on Land). SDG 15 states a global ambition to “Protect, re-
store and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustain-
ably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land
degradation and halt biodiversity loss” [45].
Forest ecosystem restoration is therefore essential for many rea-
sons. Forests have the most species diversity on the planet, with some
80% of land-based species. Forests also reduce the risk of natural dis-
asters such as floods, droughts, and landslides and help protect wa-
tersheds [45]. Further, forests are critical for mitigating land-based
carbon emissions by increasing carbon sequestration, critical for cli-
mate change prevention goals [46]. Project Drawdown, for example,
has calculated that the restoration and protection of tropical forests
could lead to 61.23 gigatons of carbon reduction by 2050 [17].
Achieving these goals requires the restoration of forest ecosystems
through the cultivation of trees, known as afforestation [16]. Applied
afforestation projects typically involve three stages - planning, execu-
tion, and monitoring of ecosystem restoration. Several AI technolo-
gies have been used in afforestation efforts and their use is increasing.
During planning, AI systems have been used to predict forest carbon
sequestration potential through the use of satellite and drone image
data [47, 54]. AI can also facilitate execution of afforestation through
computer vision algorithms used in identifying appropriate planting
sites, monitoring plant health, and analyzing trends [18]. Lastly, in
the monitoring stage of restoration projects, AI can be used to iden-
tify where deforestation may have been conducted illegally [32, 38],
as well as assess risks due to fire, disease, insects, or other causes
[62].
4.2 Current Challenges
While AI thus has great potential to contribute to SDG efforts and
social good in this case, there are complications with translating the
aforementioned goals into responsible practices. We focus on one
specific challenge leading to a gap in responsible AI practice – the
issue of multi-stakeholder coordination.
According to international governance efforts like the UN SDGs,
the UN Forum on Forests, Agenda 21, and the Future We Want (the
outcome document of the Rio+20 Conference) there is a need for
holistic, multi-stakeholder engagement to address forest ecosystem
restoration adequately [10, 67]. This is due to the existence of mul-
tiple groups with critical interests in forest ecosystems. Local com-
munities and businesses may engage in harvesting timber, farming,
and industrial exploitation to produce resources and support local
economies. Natives living off the land have an essential stake, as their
livelihood may depends on hunting animals and harvesting plants and
other materials. Government officials tasked with maintaining forests
or woodlands need to monitor the quantity and kind of trees to har-
vest, and NGOs focused on conservationism may attend to animal
life and biodiversity as well. Finally, policymakers must also worry
about carbon sequestration and climate change efforts.
Though the goals of these groups are not always in conflict, they
can come from different perspectives and have competing priorities.
Therefore, AI-driven systems used for afforestation that do not take
into account these “multiple ecological, economic, social and cul-
tural roles” important to various stakeholders [45] may lead to blind
spots and unintended harms. For example, an AI system that uses
imaging data to determine carbon sequestration potential could op-
timize climate change goals in a narrow sense, but fail to account
for social-ecological aspects of the land important to indigenous
groups, or ignore endangered species important to conservationists.
This could engender a lack of coordination and collaboration among
stakeholders and lead to costly delays and conflict, as parties are un-
willing to accept afforestation efforts or even work actively against
them.
As a result, carbon sequestration targets optimized in the short
term could fall short in the long term as afforestation progress fails to
translate into a sustainably managed multi-stakeholder effort. Failing
to develop and implement AI systems for ecosystem restoration in a
participatory fashion is thus an example of how the laudable goal of
improving environmental well-being can fail to translate into respon-
sible and effective practices.
4.3 Applying Impact Assessment
It is therefore important for developers of AI systems to consider that
numerous groups have stakes in forest ecosystem restoration. As dis-
cussed by Rolnick et al. in the case of AI [56], “Each stakeholder
has different interests, and each often has access to a different por-
tion of the data that would be useful for impactful [machine learn-
ing] applications. Interfacing between these different stakeholders is
a practical challenge for meaningful work in this area.” Landowners,
policymakers, public and private sector organizations, local commu-
nities, and others need to have a voice in the application of AI to
forest ecosystem restoration.
How would AI impact assessments such as the IEEE 7010 well-
being impact assesssment help in this instance? As discussed in Sec-
tion 3, the assessment process involves a broad internal analysis
by the organizations developing AI systems for forest ecosystem
restoration. This would involve trying to understand the variety of
possible stakeholders and intended or unintended impacts of their
products. A company that develops AI to identify target areas for af-
forestation given carbon sequestration potential might recognize pos-
sible impacts on species diversity, the local economy, and the general
well-being of native groups.
In order to have a more accurate picture – as well as to build con-
sensus among stakeholders – the company would then begin the user
and stakeholder engagement process. This would involve talking to
local governments procuring the company’s AI systems about the
need for a holistic implementation of afforestation efforts. Critically,
it would involve soliciting the input of the numerous stakeholders
mentioned such as conservation groups, landowners, scientists, gov-
ernment officials, local businesses, and native populations. For ex-
ample, a method like participatory action research or other partici-
patory design methods [64] could be used to facilitate this engage-
ment.
This process, which should be ongoing and iterative throughout
the management of the forest ecosystem, should surface a number
of clear concerns about possible implications of the afforestation ef-
forts. For example, the company may have originally been optimiz-
ing a target through their AI system such as SDG indicators 15.1.1,
”Forest area as a proportion of total land area,” or 15.3.1, ”Proportion
of land that is degraded over total land area.” However, the impact
assessment process should lead to the flexible identification of new
indicators critical to having a broader understanding of the broader
social, economic, and ecological context.
These new indicators – reflecting economic, health, and gover-
nance concerns as well as environmental ones – could include, for
example, SDG indicators 3.3.5, ”Number of people requiring inter-
ventions against neglected tropical diseases,” 1.5.2, ”Direct disaster
economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product,” or 11.3.2
”Proportion of cities with direct participation structure of civil soci-
ety in urban planning and management that operate regularly and
democratically.” These and other indicators, not necessarily picked
from the SDG indicators, would therefore operationalize possible
dimensions and impacts of the forest ecosystem management effort
– disease, natural disasters, and participatory governance – as spe-
cific measurable indicators. The company in collaboration with part-
ners would endeavor to measure these impacts, not merely carbon
sequestration or forest area as a proportion of land area.
Finally, the company in collaboration with partners, would have
several ways to use this new and deeper understanding of the well-
being implications of their AI system. One such approach would be
embedding this expert domain knowledge garnered from the partici-
patory process into the architecture of the AI system itself [35]. For
example, an AI system that previously optimized carbon sequestra-
tion potential as part of its objective function could incorporate new
data regarding tropical diseases or natural disasters as additional con-
straints or targets in the optimization of its model.
However, not all efforts to address the identified well-being im-
pacts need be strictly technical in nature. Changes to organizational
practices and governance strategies are likely called for. For example,
the company might find that accounting for species diversity directly
within the model is not sufficiently nuanced. Instead, the company
could bring initial recommendations about carbon sequestration tar-
get areas to a multi-stakeholder governance board. The board could
then offer feedback on the suitability of the recommendations given
species diversity or native land usage. While the impact assessment
process and identification of solutions would initially feel unfamiliar
and complex, the company would gradually develop best practices
and guidance towards a more responsible application of its AI sys-
tem for forest ecosystem restoration.
While this case study – the use of AI for forest ecosystem restora-
tion – is based on real uses of AI and associated real-world chal-
lenges, the specific indicators and actions taken by the company are
hypothetical. We do not mean to suggest that there are not compa-
nies or governments already taking thoughtful approaches to multi-
stakeholder governance in this area. However, to the best of the au-
thors’ knowledge, current sustainability efforts have not yet incor-
porated impact assessments of AI-driven technological solutions ap-
plied to ecosystem restoration. We hope this case study helps demon-
strate how impact assessments are a promising tool to close the
principles-to-practices gap towards responsible AI.
Conclusion
In this paper, we reviewed and synthesized explanations for the gap
between high-level responsible AI principles and the capacity to im-
plement those principles in practice. We identified five explanations
for the gap, related to the complexity of AI’s impacts on well-being,
the distribution of accountability, socio-technical and disciplinary di-
vides, a lack of clarity and guidance around tool usage, and func-
tional separations within organizations that preclude effective inter-
disciplinary practices.
Next, we considered the criteria of a framework likely to help close
the principles-to-practices gap, and identified that impact assessment
is one such approach. An impact assessment approach to responsible
AI, unlike some alternative approaches, has the potential to be broad,
operationalizable, flexible, iterative, guided, and participatory. After
reviewing the benefits of impact assessment and the well-being im-
pact assessment approach of IEEE 7010, we suggested changes that
educational institutions and companies can make to supportive effec-
tive and responsible AI practices.
Finally, we considered the use of AI in forest ecosystem restora-
tion efforts. In the face of complex impacts and possible conflicts
between stakeholders that could inhibit sustainable forest manage-
ment efforts, impact assessment offers promise for those wishing to
close the principles-to-practices gap.
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